

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**INSURGENCIES: PARALLELS BETWEEN THE CAUSES AND MEANS OF  
THE AMERICAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE AND AFGHANISTAN**

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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April 2010

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## **Abstract**

The American Revolutionary War is one of the most famous and successful insurgencies, yet has rarely been used as a case study for why an insurgency has succeeded. Afghanistan in the post-9/11 era faces an insurgency from numerous groups that threaten the stability and legitimacy of the Karzai government, and the resolve of the Western coalition. Acknowledging the dangers of templating one conflict on another, this paper will identify the shared causes behind the two insurgencies and will highlight the shared means by which the two conflicts kept/keep their insurgencies alive. In terms of causes, it will discuss cultural, political, and economic ideologies, as well as the referent power of vocal leaders. In terms of methods and means, it will address propaganda and information operations, use of the coercive militia force, external support, vilification of public figures, education of the masses, strategies of home front exhaustion, cultural identity, a security void, and a duty to fight. The paper does not prescribe definitive strategies for success in Afghanistan, but concludes with suggested areas of further research, emphasizing the importance of a shared struggle for identity. In the end, the similarities between the insurgencies are abundant, and an assessment of parallel critical factors is appropriate.

The American War for Independence (1775-1783) is arguably one of the most famous and successful insurgencies. Its conclusion established the United States as a sovereign self-governed territory, despite the fact that this was continuously challenged for the century following the revolution. Today, insurgent forces both internal and external to Afghanistan challenge the current government, threatening its survival and prompting foreign states and alliances to intervene. Admittedly, a host of differences exists between these two situations, such as the nature of the threatened government (Britain worked to maintain its *external* rule over its 13 American colonies while Afghanistan works for the survival and *internal* legitimacy of the Karzai government). However, this paper will highlight several parallels of the two insurgencies, focusing on both the causes behind the insurrections and the means by which the revolutions were/are able to persist. It is beyond the scope of this essay to prescribe definitive strategies for counterinsurgent success in the current Afghanistan conflict. Rather, it is the author's hope that identifying the similarities between the causes and means of the Afghanistan and American insurgencies will enable policy makers to mitigate potential causes and to remove any overlooked means by which rebels continue to resist in the current Afghanistan conflict. This paper assumes the reader has a rudimentary familiarity with the American War for Independence, as well as with the principal groups in the post-9/11 Afghanistan conflict. Readers lacking a basic knowledge of either subject may refer to the Appendix for a recommended reading list to establish some insurgency fundamentals in these two areas.

This discussion will begin by examining the similarities between the causes of both the American and Afghanistan insurgencies. The sources of these two conflicts do not overlap perfectly. For example, a major cause of the American Revolution revolved around the legality of British actions. Orators like James Otis argued that neither the British Constitution, nor the Magna Carta empowered Parliament to usurp the natural rights of man.<sup>1</sup> Yet, discussions of the

legal foundations for authority are not central to claims or suspected motivations of Afghanistan insurgents. Instead, one scholar suggests a unique reason for that insurgency lies in the widespread unemployment and poverty of the Afghani youth.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, the impoverished class argument is not offered by leading American Revolution theorists. This section, then, will focus on the general causes that are common to both insurgencies, rather than illuminating every possible source for each. Additionally, the Afghanistan insurgency analysis will center on the Taliban, acknowledging however, that several other insurgent groups exist there.

First, both conflicts rely significantly on ideology to motivate the respective masses to action. In the American case, one of the primary ideological causes was cultural. Many Americans saw themselves as separate and distinct from Europeans, believing that they were victims of European selfishness; for example, they painted the Seven Years' War as a British war over British-created balance of power problems, forced on the colonies by a foreign power.<sup>3</sup> As a result, they joined the insurgency because they were unwilling to allow any further perceived exploitation by Britain. In Afghanistan too, the Taliban frequently reject Western culture, seeing the Western coalition as singularly counter to their identity and their desired Sharia law state.<sup>4</sup> Some scholars have even argued that US involvement probably feels like foreign oppression, and that the collective memory of foreign intervention is a difficult cultural yoke to discard.<sup>5</sup> In both cases, insurgents rallied the neutral population to their cause by creating an "us-them" relationship, highlighting and perhaps exaggerating cultural differences.

Another cause at the heart of both insurgencies is the idea of perceived imperialism or mercantilism. Although these concepts are not synonymous, it is the shared perception by the masses that make them relevant. During the American Revolution, one of the greatest factors driving the insurgency was British mercantilism. The British needed to pay off their extensive national debt from the Seven Years' War, and saw the colonies not as trade partners, but as

economically prosperous raw material sources that owed Britain reimbursement and tribute.<sup>6</sup> The insurgents interpreted this as arbitrary economic slavery, referencing the exorbitant taxes on molasses, the search and seizure of personal property, and the prohibition against westward economic expansion.<sup>7</sup> Even one supreme court justice who became the British governor of Massachusetts, Thomas Hutchinson, was seen as an American puppet of the mercantilist British empire. Many Afghans, on the other hand, view President Karzai as a puppet of the imperialist West; they perceive his government as implementing US policy that does not have the best interests of the Afghani people at heart.<sup>8</sup> Again, insurgents in both conflicts highlighted the perceived imperialism and mercantilism of the governments as counter to the peoples' interests.

Yet another common cause was the issue of adequate representation in the governments. In the American example, the British did not provide the Americans representation in Parliament, the governmental body responsible for legislating and appropriating; even the pro-American court justice and governor Hutchinson, did not believe Americans were entitled to the privilege of direct representation.<sup>9</sup> This issue surfaced again in Afghanistan, though in a slightly different form. Much of the insurgent criticism has centered on the lack of ethnic balance in the Afghanistan government; the few ethnicities and tribes represented fail to garner enough support to legitimize the central government state-wide.<sup>10</sup> As a result, warlords and tribal governments failed to "buy in" to Karzai's central government; insufficient power-sharing created the grounds for discontent.<sup>11</sup> This ties back to the American War for Independence in another way. Just as tribal and warlord support for the insurgencies undermines the legitimacy of the Afghanistan government,<sup>12</sup> so did professional societies and lobbies like the Caucus Club, the Merchants' Society, and the Sons of Liberty undermine the legitimacy of British rule.<sup>13</sup> In fact, one could argue that the sheer number of disenfranchised Afghani tribes and warlords as insurgents is similar to the British question of whether they faced 13 insurgencies or a single united one.

Two final causes warrant mention. The first is the insurgents' perception of their duty to fight. In the American insurgency, local rebel militias pressured the neutral populace to choose a side in the conflict; they worked to change the population's minds away from the stance that nothing was at stake to justify their families' potential suffering.<sup>14</sup> This closely parallels the ideological duty to fight that the Taliban insists Afghans must embrace. They reference the concept of "nang" or honor and argue that defending the tribal "nang" is the responsibility of all good Afghans.<sup>15</sup> In each instance, defending honor (Afghanistan) or the inalienable rights of man (America) were the war cries uttered to motivate the neutral masses to action. The other common cause was the referent power of a small group of leaders. In the Revolutionary War, the interrelationship of Otis, Hutchinson, and Samuel Adams complemented each other to draw citizens from society's periphery into the rebel folds; from the British perspective, individuals such as these were labeled vocal demagogues who excited fears.<sup>16</sup> The propaganda and information campaigns they used will be discussed later as a means, rather than a cause.

In Afghanistan, the referent power of another small group of leaders facilitated recruitment; tribal elders, warlords, and most importantly, Taliban leaders trained in Pakistani madrassas possess sufficient respect and authority to convince the masses to commit to the insurgency.<sup>17</sup> In both cases, the ruling government failed to adequately state its case. In America, Britain did not effectively state its economic policy rationale or its interpretation of the right to govern, so the vocal insurgency gained ground and served to politically educate the masses.<sup>18</sup> In Afghanistan, the lack of a formal political and religious education to counter the Taliban leaders' claims provides no alternative to the extreme Deobandi doctrine.<sup>19</sup> In the end, both American and Taliban insurgents share a multitude of alleged causes, spurring them to resist the established governments; yet it is the plethora of shared means that enabled their movements to persist.

This paper will now explore the commonalities between the two insurgencies' methods and means that facilitated their continued success. The first such shared means is the vilification of authority figures in the established government. American colonists slandered Lord North, Governor Hutchinson, and the Parliament in order to dehumanize insurgent opponents.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, Taliban members have likened President Karzai to the previous British-seated Afghan kings, and have vilified both former US President Bush and former UK Prime Minister Blair.<sup>21</sup> Along these lines, insurgents in both conflicts specifically targeted government outreach programs and individuals for attacks. In America, rebels ransacked Justice Hutchinson's home for his (incorrectly) assumed support of the Stamp Act and British mercantilist policies.<sup>22</sup> In Afghanistan, Taliban continue to target a government refurbishment program of a dam northwest of Kandahar; despite the prospect of thousands of jobs, increased electricity supply, and quality of life improvement, insurgents there see that infrastructure as symbolic of governmental attempts to support and control the population.<sup>23</sup> A related means for prolonging the two insurgencies is the use of propaganda and information. Otis's multiple publications that rationalize the illegality of British rule and suppression of rights, Paine's *Common Sense*, and the Continental Congress' multiple declarations of man's liberty, exemplify the breadth and variety of propaganda used to further the rebels' cause.<sup>24</sup> In Afghanistan, the "neo-Taliban's" use of video, the internet, paper media, and radio broadcasts demonstrate the priority of effort these insurgents place on effective information operations.<sup>25</sup> The mastery of media is clearly a means by which insurgents in both campaigns promote their causes.

Yet another shared methodology is unclear governmental policy on the reconciliation of former insurgents. In the American War for Independence, Britain reversed its reintegration policy multiple times, offending both American Loyalists (who wanted harsh treatment of the insurgents) and the neutral population (who later leaned toward the insurgency to avoid fighting



their fellow Americans).<sup>26</sup> Afghan insurgents are similarly waffling between shifting coalition policies concerning their reintegration in Afghan society. This relates in large part to the next shared means: a strategy of a prolonged war and exhaustion on the home front. As in most insurgencies, the Taliban is committed in the long-term to a solution that outlasts both the Afghan government and the ISAF coalition.<sup>27</sup> By opening a dialogue for potential reintegration while simultaneously continuing their recruitment and insurgent attacks, the Taliban likely hope to wear down public support in the coalition countries. In a similar manner, American rebels strove to prolong the conflict with Britain, to a point where Britain would tire of the slow drain of its blood and treasure.<sup>28</sup> One of the ways Americans hoped to extend their fight against Britain was through foreign aid, the next shared means.

American rebels exercised their fledgling diplomatic might by negotiating with France and Spain to secure monetary aid military supplies, and alternate trade arrangements; this foreign aid was particularly significant in the light of British curtailment of colonial trading rights in late 1775.<sup>29</sup> One of the keys to success of any insurgency is a steady logistics trail for financial and military support. The Americans understood this requirement and capitalized on the balance of power struggles among the European states. So too, has the Taliban capitalized on foreign aid. Although it appears to have greatly subsided, Pakistan initially offered both sanctuary and aid through its under-governed FATA region.<sup>30</sup> The porous borders between the two countries and the popular support, or at least neutrality, of the majority of the Pakistan border region populace, provided tacit aid to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Unsurprisingly, this means of propagating an insurgency is inextricably linked to another method: widespread local sympathy to the revolutionary cause.

In America, British efforts to address perceived grievances failed partly because of the extent to which the locals sympathized with the insurgent cause.<sup>31</sup> This sympathy was

exacerbated by the inhumane treatment of the populace by the provincial government and the British Redcoats in the colonies. Often insurgents would publicize the alleged barbarism by British forces, pushing undecided citizens to the Popular and Whig parties and frequently, the rebel view; the “Boston Massacre” or killing of 5 Americans by provoked British military forces is one such example.<sup>32</sup> Further, the British adopted coercive counterinsurgency laws and attempted to strong-arm the neutral population into more overt Loyalist support.<sup>33</sup> The American insurgents leveraged these acts to garner more support to their side. The British hampered their own efforts because of their erroneous belief that the American population was predominantly friendly.<sup>34</sup> It could be argued that Americans in Iraq later made this mistake in 2003-2007, as the counterinsurgent force. The Taliban has availed itself of the coalition’s same coercive counterinsurgent efforts; by publicizing Western aerial bombardment of civilians, it has helped turn the umma, or greater Islamic community, toward the insurgents’ cause.<sup>35</sup> Similarly, the Taliban uses the coalition’s kinetic efforts that cause collateral damage or harm Afghan civilians as rationale for revenge and the preservation of “nang.”<sup>36</sup> Regardless of the theater, overestimation of the population’s sympathy or personal stake in a cause can lead to recalcitrant reactions by the neutral masses. Worse yet are strong-arming or over-legislating tactics that may unwittingly push a society away from the government and into the camp of the insurgent.

If a society perceives that the government cannot protect it, it may see little recourse other than joining the alternative--the insurgency. This may occur if the government fails to protect its citizens from rough treatment by its military forces, or if it fails to isolate them from the insurgents’ recruitment efforts. In the Revolutionary War, American citizens perceived that the Crown government was incapable of protecting them from the inhumane treatment of Redcoats, and from the rebel militia’s acts of terror.<sup>37</sup> In this case, this lack of security facilitated the insurgency to continue. A parallel exists in Afghanistan. Several scholars agree that the Karzai

government and the ISAF coalition do not sufficiently protect the civilian population, and that the lack of law, order, and security in the periphery helps to shape an environment where insurgency seems a viable alternative.<sup>38</sup> This lack of security could cause the source of a family's anxiety to shift. Whereas the family's initial anxiety centered on survival needs such as food and shelter, the security void shifts the threat to both government-sanctioned bombs and to the lack of or spurious protection from insurgent pressures. In this scenario, the dearth of law and order may drive the family to choose insurgency as a last resort. Presumably, if they have one less security threat (the insurgents), they can refocus on providing for their basic human needs. Logically, one could argue that the Afghanistan government has failed to provide adequate essential services as well; this argument, however, did not apply to the American insurgency.

Two final shared means exist in both the American and Afghanistan conflicts. First, in both cases, the rebel militia was sufficiently troublesome to attrit a modest amount of government forces and to further cause international opinion to waver. In the Revolutionary War, General Washington disliked part-time militia soldiers (contrasted with the regulars in the Continental Army), but fully admitted their utility in the "petite guerre." The frequency and prevalence of constant irregular warfare attacks on the periphery caused fielded force attrition, deteriorated the British morale, and scored minute psychological victories for the insurgent cause.<sup>39</sup> In Afghanistan, the Taliban pairs with other extreme insurgent groups to employ peripheral attacks against ISAF troops using IEDs, ambushes, rocket attacks, or even suicide bombs. Although they typically avoid conventional force-on-force battles, the guerilla type attacks strike similar psychological blows to the Afghanistan government, the coalition's public opinion, and the morale of the coalition forces. The impenetrable Carolina swamps and New England forests from which American rebels operated with impunity in the Revolutionary War parallel the Hindu Kush range or the Tora Bora caves from which the Taliban operate today.

The final means common to both insurgencies was the rebel militia's efforts to coerce the civilian population. American militia members in the War for Independence frankly forced citizens to join; in one instance, the Connecticut Assembly drafted all men of fighting age into the state militia, and mandated prison for those who refused.<sup>40</sup> The significance here is that the militias were frequently the coercive means by which a constant source of insurgent recruits were created. In Afghanistan, the Taliban deliver "night letters" to villagers to coerce them against supporting the Karzai government or coalition efforts; these often reflect the cultural values of the respective tribes, and imply a threat for non-compliance (at least in the afterlife).<sup>41</sup> Another coercive tactic employed by the Taliban is the forced recruitment of village sons into service; such actions may create a culture of fear that produces loose village support of Taliban actions, with the hope that this may protect the child.<sup>42</sup> Clearly, this means to perpetuate an insurgency is compounded by the lack of security discussed earlier.

The American War for Independence is undoubtedly one of the most successful and well-known insurgencies. The fact that a loose union of diverse colonies persisted long enough in irregular warfare to force the surrender of Lord Cornwallis, to secure French and Spanish aid, to garner several tactical military victories, to unify the population behind a strategic cause, to effect the Treaty of Paris, and to ultimately create one of the most influential modern nation-states demands a deeper analysis of just how these events came to pass. Moreover, if viewed as a textbook example of how an insurgency can succeed, the Revolutionary War ought to provide insights to both sides of an insurgent movement. By examining the underlying causes of the American Revolution and by analyzing the means through which the insurgency was fueled, both freedom fighters and counterinsurgents alike can pinpoint critical and relevant elements. More pertinent to modern conflict, coalition members involved in the Afghanistan COIN efforts might gain some insight into the adversaries' crucial enablers. While mindful of the dangers of

templating one conflict on another, this paper has attempted to identify and compare the causes and means that the American Revolution and Afghanistan insurgency share. Causes such as cultural, economic, and political ideologies exist in both theaters. Emerging national identities, accusations of imperialism and mercantilism, and appropriate representation in government helped fuel each insurgency. Further, leaders with extensive referent power and mastery of the prevalent media have proven pivotal to rallying the undecided masses toward the insurgencies. On the other hand, the vilification of government figures, reliance on external aid, strategies of exhausting the public will to fight, the coercive employment of militia members, and the emphasis on one's duty to fight are recurring themes and critical enablers to a prolonged battle.

Without being prescriptive to the current experts living this daily fight in Afghanistan, several options may warrant further exploration. A formal political and religious education may offer reasonable alternatives to emotionally charged Taliban arguments. Longer and overnight coalition presence in peripheral areas may begin to counter the perceived lack of security in those regions. Proactive information operations and immediate responses to insurgent propaganda challenges may stem the tide of the media war the Taliban appears to dominate. Although it may be difficult to envision, one of the reasons democracy and republicanism succeeded subsequent to the American insurgency was that so many Americans fought, died, and unified behind these principles and for these causes. This shared conflict created the foundation for a shared national identity. Identifying a culturally-appropriate and parallel unifying theme that can connect and bolster the ties of Afghan citizens of various tribes will serve a similar purpose. Further, this theme may not resemble democracy, republicanism, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," or even the "inalienable rights of man." Without this voluntary uprising behind a unifying theme, the author doubts that Afghan citizens will put much faith in any government. A shared sacrifice akin to the American insurgency may be the catalyst for evolution of the Afghan identity.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> John R. Galvin, *Three Men of Boston: Leadership and Conflict at the Start of the American Revolution*, New York: T.Y. Crowell, 1976, 3, 28, 31.
- <sup>2</sup> Anne Stenersen, "The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan - Organization, Leadership and Worldview," Research Report no. 0359, Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 5 February 2010, 22; Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its Peoples and Politics*, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002, 299.
- <sup>3</sup> Richard Van Alstyne, *Empire and Independence: The International History of the American Revolution*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965, 30; Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1957, 12.
- <sup>4</sup> Antonio Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, 12; Stenersen, 22.
- <sup>5</sup> Najibullah Lafraie, "Resurgence of the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan: How and Why?" *International Politics*, 46, no. 1 (2009): 111-12.
- <sup>6</sup> Galvin, 7, 12.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid, 25, 27, 33; Van Alstyne, 23, 25.
- <sup>8</sup> Lafraie, 109; Stenersen, 48, 50.
- <sup>9</sup> Bernard Bailyn, *The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson*, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1974, 90-91.
- <sup>10</sup> Seth G. Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad," *International Security*, 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 12; Giustozzi, 11.
- <sup>11</sup> Lafraie, 107.
- <sup>12</sup> Sébastien Trives, "Afghanistan: Tackling the Insurgency, the Case of the Southeast," *Politique Etrangère*, 1 (2006): 109-11; Seth G. Jones, "Averting Failure in Afghanistan." *Survival*, 48, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 114.
- <sup>13</sup> Galvin, 291-2; Van Alstyne, 26-27.
- <sup>14</sup> John Shy, "The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," in *Essays on the American Revolution*, edited by Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Huston, 121-156, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1973, taken from Joseph R. Fischer, "People's Revolutionary War: The American Experience," in *H300: Roots of Today's Operational Environment: Syllabus and Book of Readings*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College (December 2009): H301RA-34, 36.
- <sup>15</sup> Raja G. Hussain, "Badal: A Culture of Revenge; The Impact of Collateral Damage on Taliban Insurgency," Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2008, 28.
- <sup>16</sup> Galvin, 291-2; Bailyn, 71; Van Alstyne, 22.
- <sup>17</sup> Hussain, 16, 23, 48, 55, 57.
- <sup>18</sup> Shy, 37.
- <sup>19</sup> Trives, 110-12.
- <sup>20</sup> Van Alstyne, 38.
- <sup>21</sup> Hussain, 60; Lafraie, 109.
- <sup>22</sup> Galvin 100-107.
- <sup>23</sup> Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency," 37-38.
- <sup>24</sup> Van Alstyne, 38; Galvin, 48, 291-2.
- <sup>25</sup> Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency," 30.
- <sup>26</sup> Steven J. Rauch, "Southern (Dis)Comfort: British Phase IV Operations in South Carolina and Georgia, May-September 1780, In *The US Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775-2007*, edited

by Richard G. Davis, 33-58, Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2007, taken from Joseph R. Fischer, "People's Revolutionary War: The American Experience," in *H300: Roots of Today's Operational Environment: Syllabus and Book of Readings*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College (December 2009): H301RA-47, 50, 56.

<sup>27</sup> Trives, 112-114.

<sup>28</sup> Joseph R. Fischer, "Advance Sheet for Lesson 301--People's Revolutionary War: The American Experience," in *H300: Roots of Today's Operational Environment: Syllabus and Book of Readings*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College (December 2009): H301RA-16.

<sup>29</sup> Bemis, 19-22, 28, 38, 41-45; Van Alstyne, 71.

<sup>30</sup> Giustozzi, 21; Jones, "Averting Failure in Afghanistan," 121; Lafraie, 103.

<sup>31</sup> Shy, 28.

<sup>32</sup> Rauch, 57; Galvin, 190-200.

<sup>33</sup> Shy, 29, 32.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 31.

<sup>35</sup> Ewans, 289.

<sup>36</sup> Hussain, 2, 37, 59-60.

<sup>37</sup> Shy, 32-33.

<sup>38</sup> Giustozzi, 19; Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency," 8, 17; Jones, "Averting Failure in Afghanistan," 114.

<sup>39</sup> Shy, 27, 35.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 35-36.

<sup>41</sup> Hussain, 42-46.

<sup>42</sup> Carlotta Gall, "Families Try to Trace Thousands of Missing Taliban, Many Forced to Fight," *The New York Times (Late Edition (East Coast))*, 21 February 2002.

## Appendix

The following resources may be helpful to those readers needing a more fundamental knowledge base concerning the American War for Independence, the Afghanistan conflict in the post-9/11 environment, and the general nature of insurgencies. They are listed in recommended reading order.

Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1964. Chapters 1-3.

*(The definitive text on insurgencies, their prerequisites, and their associated doctrine)*

LaFeber, Walter. *The American Age: US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad--1750 to the Present (2nd ed.)*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994. Chapter 1, pages 11-28.

*(Describes critical political/diplomatic events/issues in the American War for Independence)*

Jones, Seth G. "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad." *International Security*, 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 7-40. Available online at [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3204\\_pp007-040\\_Jones.pdf](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3204_pp007-040_Jones.pdf)

*(Summarizes insurgent activities and the strategic environment in Afghanistan)*

Galvin, John R. *Three Men of Boston: Leadership and Conflict at the Start of the American Revolution*. New York: T.Y. Crowell, 1976. Introduction and Conclusion.

*(Addresses the critical relationships of James Otis, Thomas Hutchinson, and Samuel Adams and their pivotal roles in fomenting an American insurgency)*

Friedman, George. "Strategic Divergence: The War Against the Taliban and the War Against Al Qaeda." STRATFOR Geopolitical Intelligence Report. 26 January 2009. Available online at [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090126\\_strategic\\_divergence\\_war\\_against\\_taliban\\_and\\_war\\_against\\_al\\_qaeda](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090126_strategic_divergence_war_against_taliban_and_war_against_al_qaeda)

*(Offers current Afghanistan insurgent and counterinsurgent synopsis and prognosis)*



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